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Abstract Over the years the psychological and economic literature on multi-attribute
individual decision-makinghas focused its attentionon examiningwhat class of heuris-
tics better describes subjects’ behaviour. In contrast, motivated by the proliferation of
online choice platforms, we investigate whether inducing subjects to use holistic vs.
characteristic-based search (CBS) procedures has an effect on the quality of their deci-
sion by proposing a between-subject experiment involving an innovative visual choice
task. We find that encouraging subjects to use CBS heuristics as opposed to holistic
ones makes them better off. We also examine how subjects’ performance is related
with complexity, time pressure, and random choice by running simulations and link
our results to the related literature.
We would like to thank Marco Tecilla for excellent computer programming. We are extremely grateful to
an anonymous referee for her/his support to our paper, the many insightful comments, and the valuable
suggestions on the research program. We also thank Miguel Costa-Gomes, Paola Manzini, Ariel
Rubinstein, the participants to the 2016 International Meeting on Experimental and Behavioral Social
Sciences (Rome), the seminar audiences at the universities of Aberdeen, St Andrews and Trento and the
editor of this journal. Financial support from the University of Trento’s core funding is gratefully
acknowledged. Any error is our own responsibility.
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s11238-017-9590-3)





1 Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, University of Trento,
via Verdi, 26, 38100 Trento, Italy
2 School of Business, University of Aberdeen, Edward Wright Building, Dunbar Street,
Aberdeen AB243QY, UK
123
L. Mittone, M. Papi
Keywords Between-subject · Characteristic-based search · Heuristic · Holistic ·
Multi-attribute problem · Simulations
1 Introduction
Over the past years innovative online choice platforms have been developed to facil-
itate the consumer’s purchasing decisions. For example, a consumer interested in
purchasing a high-performance sports car can visit the Ferrari’s web-site and use the
car configurator, which allows the consumer to design his ideal car by shaping its char-
acteristics, such as colour, seat type and, wheel cap.1 Another example is given by
web-sites that through dedicated web-search engines allow the consumer to shortlist
the set of available products by specifying the characteristics that the desired product
should possess. Rightmove.co.uk, for instance, is a British website specialized in flat
renting and gives the consumer the opportunity to shortlist on the basis of attributes,
such as location, number of bedrooms, and rental price.2
Such choice platforms induce the consumer to follow certain choice procedures.
In the Ferrari’s car configurator case, the consumer is asked to construct his most
preferred product by combining a set of available attributes. In the Rightmove.co.uk’s
case, on the other hand, the consumer has to shortlist the set of available products
by specifying what properties his most desirable product should satisfy. In general
the nature of the choice procedure utilized by a decision-maker might have an effect
on the outcome of the decision and, as a result, on the welfare of the decision-maker
himself. So far the psychological and economic literature on multi-attribute individual
decision-making has focused its attention on examining what choice procedure better
describes the subjects’ behaviour.3 In contrast, motivated by the continuing expansion
of online choice platforms, we investigate whether inducing subjects to use holistic
vs. characteristic-based search (CBS) procedures makes them better off.
Holistic procedures are procedures according to which the decision-maker exam-
ines the attributes within alternatives. Utility maximisation is an example of a holistic
procedure, as a rational decision-maker first examines the attributes within an alter-
native (e.g. the prizes and the corresponding probabilities of a lottery), ‘attaches’ a
utility value to it (e.g. expected utility), and then examines the next alternative. Another
example of a holistic procedure is the satisficing heuristic (Simon 1955). CBS pro-
cedures, on the other hand, are procedures according to which the decision-maker
examines the attributes across alternatives (Payne et al. 1993). The lexicographic and
elimination-by-aspects (Tversky 1972) procedures are CBS examples. A decision-
maker following a CBS procedure focuses his attention on one dimension (or various
dimensions) only and discards all alternatives that are dominated on that dimension
or do not meet a certain pre-determined threshold. Unlike traditional supermarkets,
1 See figure 1 in the supplementary material.
2 See figure 2 in the supplementary material.
3 See Gigerenzer et al. (2011) as an example in the psychological literature and Gabaix et al. (2006) as an
example in the economic literature. We will extensively discuss the related psychological and economic
literature in Sect. 6.
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online choice platforms, such as the ones described above, typically induce procedures
that encompass CBS elements.4
Our research question is relevant for both psychologists and economists for various
reasons. First, understanding whether inducing individuals to use different cognitive-
comparative processes of the alternative’s characteristics has an effect on the quality
of their decision is a key problem. Second, it is interesting to examine whether or not
subjects perform better by using a class of heuristics (i.e., CBS) that are generally
inconsistent with the application of the utility maximisation procedure. Third, given
the growing interest within economic theory about rational and boundedly rational
choice procedures, our experiment ‘searches for facts’ within the domain of multi-
attribute decision problems.5
In this paper we propose a between-subject design in which subjects are asked to
perform the same choice task by inducing them to use different procedures. Our exper-
iment consists of an innovative visual choice task, whereby subjects are shown a target
alternative—an abstract figure—and asked to select or construct the alternative that
most closely looks like the target. The baseline treatment induces a holistic procedure
by asking subjects to select the figure that most closely looks like the target among
those available. In contrast, two other treatments, which we call build and destroy,
induce—in different ways—subjects to use characteristic-based search (CBS) proce-
dures by asking them to construct the figure the most closely looks like the target
figure by combining the blocs available. Across all treatments we vary both the time
pressure level—interpretable as the search cost—and the complexity of the choice
task.
It is worth emphasizing that in this experiment we fully control subjects’ prefer-
ences, which we induce via monetary incentives. This is not because we rule out the
possibility that inducing individuals to use certain choice procedures does not have an
effect on their preferences. On the contrary, we believe that the preference-formation
issue is relevant within the broader context of our research question. However, we
think that our methodology is appropriate for at least two reasons. First, given that our
aim is to understand whether inducing choice procedures has an effect on individuals’
welfare, we need to know their preferences to be able to make welfare judgments.
Inducing preferences via monetary incentives is a standard technique in experimental
economics to achieve this goal (Smith 1976; Camerer and Hogarth 1999). Second,
4 The Rightmove.co.uk’s web-search engine induces an heuristic that resembles a CBS, because it imple-
ments a shortlisting procedure in the sense that it encourages the consumer to think about characteristics
that he likes and discards all flats that do not possess those, such as a rental price greater than £850 per
calendar month, less than two bedrooms, and a location more than three miles away from the desired one.
The Ferrari’s car configurator also induces a heuristic that encompasses CBS elements, as it induces the
consumer to focus his attention on the car’s characteristics sequentially (e.g. the choice of the colour first,
then that of the wheel cap, then that of the seat and so on) with the objective of creating one alternative.
On the contrary, in traditional supermarkets the available products are already constructed and—leaving
aside some generic labels on the shelves to direct attention—consumers are not induced to use shortlisting
procedures.
5 This theoretic literature includes, for instance, Manzini andMariotti (2007) and Apesteguia and Ballester
(2013) that propose a model in which the decision-maker uses a shortlisting procedure. Rubinstein and
Salant (2006) and Caplin and Dean (2011), on the other hand, formalize the satisficing heuristic proposed
by Simon (1955).
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since our study is—to the best of our knowledge—the first to investigate the effects
of inducing individuals to use certain choice procedures, it is natural to start with an
experimental design over which we have as much control as possible to be able to
isolate the different effects.6 The natural following step of this research, which we are
already working on, is to extend the current experimental design with the objective of
examining whether (and possibly how) preferences are affected by the inducement to
use certain choice procedures.
The results of our experiment are threefold. First, inducing subjects to certain
choice procedures has an effect on their welfare. Specifically, subjects’ performance
is distinctly better in the build and destroy treatments than in the baseline treatment,
indicating that inducing subjects to use CBS heuristics (as opposed to holistic ones)
increases their welfare. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first one to show
that CBS procedures may be welfare increasing. If we interpret subjects’ behaviour
as being the implementation of some payoff-maximizing objective function subject
to cognitive constraints, then our results suggest that inducing subjects to use CBS
procedures relaxes their cognitive constraints and, as a result, improves their perfor-
mance. We also detect a slight difference in performance between build and destroy
in favour of the destroy treatment. We attribute such difference to the fact that, by the
nature of the treatments themselves, it takes more time to construct an alternative in
the build than in the destroy treatment. As a result, especially at relatively high time
pressure levels, subjects tend to do better in the destroy treatment.
Second, by looking at disaggregated data by complexity, we find that the divergence
in performance between baseline and build/destroy is maximised at intermediate com-
plexity levels. That is, at simple problems the assignment to the treatment does not
affect subjects’ performance. As complexity increases the performance in the base-
line treatment worsens at a higher rate than in the build/destroy treatment leading to
the maximum degree of divergence at intermediate complexity levels. At relatively
high complexity levels the performance across treatments tends to converge. This sec-
ond finding suggests that the ‘ecological rationality’ of CBS heuristics holds within
a certain range of complexity. At very simple and very complex problems subjects’
performance is not affected by the nature of the heuristic induced. On the contrary, at
moderately complex problems inducing CBS procedures, as opposed to holistic ones,
pays off.
Third, we compare random choice (which we construct by running simulations)
and with subjects’ choice and find that subjects behaviour is distinctly different from
random in both the build and destroy treatment. On the contrary, in the baseline treat-
ment we find that subjects’ choice is different from random choice at relatively simple
6 Consider an experimental design similar to ours in which preferences are not controlled. Assume that we
observe an experimental subject that—when faced with the same choice problem—makes different choices
when induced to use different procedures. Twoexplanations are possible. First, the subject’s preferences have
not changed and one choice procedure has led him tomake a better choice than some other choice procedure.
Second, his preferences have changed and the experimental subject has chosen accordingly. Notice that not
only by controlling preferences the second explanation is ruled out, but also the two explanations lead to
very different conclusions: unlike in the second scenario, in the first one it makes sense to incentivize the
use of the one of the two choice procedures (i.e., the welfare-improving one).
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problems only. At relatively high complexity levels, we cannot rule random choice
out. This result is consistent with the other findings.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2presents the theoretical
framework behind the experiment; Sect. 3 discusses the experimental design; Sect. 4
illustrates the results of the simulations; Sect. 5 presents the results of the experiment;
Sect. 6 discusses the related literature and concludes. The supplementary material
contains additional figures (including examples of screenshots), a detailed comparison
of build and destroy treatments, and the instructions.
2 The theoretical framework
Our experiment can be described in terms of the choice-with-frames model proposed
by Salant andRubinstein (2008) that formalises and generalises the concept of framing
effects (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Let X denote a grand set of multi-attribute
alternatives and S a collection of non-empty subsets of X . Denote by R a set of
preference relations over X . Finally, denote by F the set of ‘frames’—additional
information other than the feasible set of alternatives that is irrelevant to a rational
decision-maker, but might affect choices.7 In the current setting we interpret a frame
as an induced choice procedure, which can be either CBS or holistic. Hence, we let
F = {CBS , holistic}. For any∈ R, S ∈ S, and f ∈ F ,wedefine c(S, f ) : S → X
with c(S, f ) ∈ S as the experimental subject’s chosen alternative from the choice
problem S under the induced preference  and the induced choice procedure f .
Our experimental design can be thought of as the triple 〈S,R,F〉 in the sense that
we have full control over the set of choice problems, the preferences, whichwe induced
via monetary incentives, and the induced choice procedure. Our main hypothesis is
summarized in Eq. 1:
c(S,CBS)
? c(S, holistic) (1)
That is, we are interested in understanding whether—ceteris paribus—inducing
subjects to use CBS vs. holistic procedures has an effect on their welfare, measured
in terms of how high in the preference ranking the chosen alternative is.
3 Experimental design
3.1 The task
In all treatments of this experiment subjects are shown a target alternative—an abstract
figure—and are financially incentivized to choose or construct the figure that most
closely looks like the target. All figures in this experiment are grids of various dimen-
sions, whose cells are coloured either red or beige (see Fig. 1). Our decision to use
7 In the theoretical literature an example of frame is given by the ordering according to which alternatives
are presented to the decisions-maker (Papi 2012).
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Fig. 1 Examples of figures of various complexity
abstract figures as alternatives is motivated by the fact that we wanted to abstract as
much as possible from the context to collect generalizable results. Abstract figures of
the kind considered here nicely serve this purpose, also because they can be partitioned
into building blocks, which can naturally be interpreted as attributes or characteristics
of the figures themselves. Throughout the paper we refer to each cell comprising a
figure as pixel and to a set of one or more adjacent pixels as block.
In the baseline treatment, figures are given and subjects have to choose one among
those available. In order to select a figure, subjects have to click on thefigure they intend
to select before the time expires and, as they do so, the selected figure appears enlarged
next to the target.8 The baseline treatment is meant to induce a holistic procedure, as
alternatives are given and subjects are induced to make pairwise comparisons between
the target and the selected alternative by inspecting all pixels of the selected alternative
before exploring the next figure.
In the build and destroy treatments, on the other hand, figures are not given, but
have to be constructed according to certain procedures. In the build treatment, subjects
are shown several blocks and a figure partitioned into blank spots—which throughout
the paper we refer to as slots—of the same dimensions as the blocks. Subjects are
asked to construct a figure by placing the blocks in the slots within the time limit.9
In order to insert a block into a slot, subjects have to first click on the block and then
on the slot. Any block can be allocated to any slot (even to multiple slots) and can be
replaced by any other block according to the procedure just described before the time
expires.
8 See figure 3 in the supplementary material for an example of a screenshot.
9 See Fig. 4 in the supplementary material for an example of a screenshot.
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In the destroy treatment, on the contrary, a figure partitioned into red blocks is
presented to subjects,whohave to change the colour (from red to beige) of the blocks.10
In order to change the colour of a block, subjects have to click on the block they intend
to change the colour to. The colour of a block can be repeatedly changed by replicating
the above procedure before the time expires. For any given target, the blocks in the
build and destroy treatment are different, but designed in such a way that the problems
in the build and destroy treatments are exactly the same. We will come back to this in
the next subsection. Both the build and the destroy treatments are meant to induce CBS
procedures, as subjects are asked to construct what they think is their most preferred
alternative by sequentially shaping its characteristics one by one.
The reason forwhich—besides the build treatment—wehave introduced the destroy
treatment is threefold. First, we wanted a second procedure other than the build treat-
ment that induces a CBS heuristic. Second, constructive procedures, such as the build
treatment, are not the only ones to induce CBS procedures. CBS procedures can be
induced also via ‘destructive procedures’, such as the destroy treatment. Having both
constructive and destructive procedures completes the analysis of CBS procedures
and, as a result, increases the robustness of our results. Third, we wanted to check
whether constructing a figure from scratch vs. decomposing an existing figure has an
effect on subjects’ performance.
In all treatments once that subjects think they have selected (or constructed) the best
alternative, they have to confirm their choice by clicking on the confirm button within
the time limit. Subjects can replace the selected (or constructed) alternative as many
times as they want before the time expires. If they select (or construct) an alternative
without confirming within the time limit, the selected (or constructed) alternative
(when the time expires) is considered to be their final choice. If at a choice problem
subjects do not select (or construct) any alternative, their payoff is automatically set
to be equal to zero as far as that choice problem is concerned.
In all treatmentswe count amistakewhenever a pixel of the selected (or constructed)
figure is different from the corresponding pixel of the target figure. Letdmax(c, t) (resp.,
dmin(c, t)) denote the maximum (resp., minimum) number of mistakes a subject can
commit at choice problem c in treatment t . Let di (c, t) denote the actual number
of mistakes committed by subject i at choice problem c in treatment t . Subject i’s
payoff πi (c, t) (in euros) at choice problem c in treatment t is defined as follows
πi (c, t) = 3 + 17 · Ii (c, t), where Ii (c, t) ≡ dmax(c,t)−di (c,t)dmax(c,t)−dmin(c,t) is the performance
index. Hence, subjects earn a show-up fee of 3 plus a (linear) performance-based
payment that lies in the interval [0, 17], which is inversely related with the number of
mistakes a subject commits. Monetary payments are rounded to the closest euro cent.
3.2 Design of the choice problems
We varied the level of both time pressure, which can be interpreted as the search
costs, and complexity. In particular, we set four different levels of time pressure—60,
80, 100, and 120 s—and six different levels of complexity, which we called Simple-
10 See figure 5 in the supplementary material for an example of a screenshot.
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Table 1 Specification of the
complexity levels
Compl. # Pixel/alt. # Alt.Ba. # Alt.Bu.De.
SF 4 16 16
SC 16 16 16
MF 36 16 262,144
MC 144 16 262,144
DF 256 16 18.4 × 1018
DC 576 16 18.4 × 1018
Fine (SF), Simple-Coarse (SC),Medium-Fine (MF),Medium-Coarse (MC), Difficult-
Fine (DF), and Difficult-Coarse (DC). In this experiment we measure complexity in
terms of the fineness (i.e., number of pixels) of the figures that subjects have to work
with (see Table 1). This definition of complexity is supported by the psychology
literature, according to which visual complexity is related with a multiplicity of visual
dimensions, such as ‘quantity of objects’, ‘symmetry’, and ‘variety of colours’ (Oliva
et al. 2004). Figure 1 shows an example of a target alternative for each complexity
level.
The second column of Table 1 reports the number of pixels that every figure of
each complexity level is made of, which we arbitrarily decided.11 The third column
reports the number of alternatives available in the baseline treatment to choose from.
The fourth column reports the number of distinct alternatives that can be constructed
in the build and destroy treatment. Note that the ‘size’ of the choice problem grows
exponentially with complexity in the build and destroy treatments. This has to do with
the intrinsic nature of these two treatments, which we will explain below. Note that, on
the contrary, the number of alternatives thatwemade available in the baseline treatment
is equal to 16 regardless of the complexity level. Ideally, the size of each choice problem
should be the same across all treatments. However, this was not possible, as it was
unfeasible to present subjects with hundreds of thousands of figures to choose from
in the baseline treatment. We addressed this issue by showing subjects 16 alternatives
only in the baseline treatment that were extracted (without replacement) at random out
of the set of alternatives that could potentially be constructed in the build and destroy
treatments.
Table 2 provides details regarding the characteristics of the build (first three
columns) and destroy treatments (fourth and fifth column): number of blocks per
figure, number of slots per figure (for the build treatment only), and number of pixels
per block. Recall that in the build treatment, subjects have to insert the blocks into
the slots available. The number of alternatives that can be created is, therefore, given
by the number of slots to the power of the number of slots. On the other hand, in
the destroy treatments subjects are asked to change to colour of the blocks (either
red or beige). Hence, the number of alternatives that can be generated in the destroy
treatment is equal to two to the power of the number of blocks. By looking at Table 2,
11 The only restrictionwas that the number of pixels has to have an integer square root to be able to construct
a squared-shaped grid.
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Table 2 Comparison build vs. destroy
Compl. Build Destroy # Alt.Bu.De.
# Blocks # Slots # Pixel/block # Blocks # Pixel/block
SF 2 4 1 4 1 16
SC 2 4 4 4 4 16
MF 4 9 4 18 2 262,144
MC 4 9 16 18 8 262,144
DF 16 16 16 64 4 18.4 × 1018
DC 16 16 36 64 9 18.4 × 1018
it can be seen that the size of the choice problems at each complexity level is the same
across the build and destroy treatments. In section 2 of the supplementary material we
graphically show that the sets of alternatives that can be created in these two treatments
actually coincide.
In this experiment all target figures were constructed in the following way: Denote
by x the number of pixels that form an alternative. We first created a squared-shaped
figure made of x empty pixels. We then randomly extracted without replacement x2
pixels of that figure and coloured them red. We finally coloured the remaining pixels
beige. We created one target alternatives for every combination of time pressure and
complexity level. So overall we created 24 (4 time pressure times 6 complexity levels)
plus an additional 6 (on for each complexity level for the practice rounds) target
alternatives. For every combination of time pressure and complexity level, subjects
faced exactly the same target alternative across the three treatments.
3.3 Implementation
A total of 58 experimental subjects were randomly recruited from a university database
of undergraduates. Subjects were taken to the lab and shown the instructions.12 Sub-
sequently an experimenter read them loudly. Subjects were then asked to solve six
practice rounds (one for each complexity level). At a later stage they were asked to
solve six series (one for each complexity level) of 4 choice problems (one for each
time-pressure level) that were valid for the calculation of their performance-based
payment. The order of the series and the choice problems within each series were
randomized as well as the order in which alternatives and blocks appeared on the
screenshots.13 After every round and at the end of each series feedback was given in
terms of the actual number of mistakes relative to the minimum andmaximum number
12 See section 3 of the supplementary material for the instructions.
13 Due to an unintended mistake in the software, the first series of choice problems in the baseline and
build treatments was complexity Simple-Fine for all experimental subjects. This mistake did not seem to
have affected the results.
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of mistakes.14 One choice problem out of 24was selected at random for calculating the
actual payoff. After the experiment subjects completed an anonymous questionnaire
on demographics. We followed standard experimental procedures.
The design of the experiment is between-subject. Twenty subjects were assigned to
the baseline treatment, twenty to the build, and eighteen to the destroy treatment. The
experiment took place on the 4th of November 2014 (baseline and build) and on the
21st of April 2015 (destroy) at the Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory
(CEEL) of the University of Trento. The software used in the experiment was designed
by the authors of the paper and the CEEL manager Mr Marco Tecilla.
4 Simulations
In order to implement the payoff function defined above, we needed to know the
maximum dmax(c, t) and the minimum dmin(c, t) number of mistakes a subject can
potentially commit at every choice problem c in each treatment t .While the calculation
of these numbers is straightforward for the baseline treatment (the size of the choice
problem is 16 regardless of complexity), figuring out dmax(·) and dmin(·) is not obvious
as far as the build and destroy treatments are concerned, because hundreds of thousands
of distinct alternatives can be constructed at relatively high complexity levels (see
Table 1).
We addressed this issue by simulating random choice in the build treatment.15 That
is, we designed a software in which a ‘subject’ repeatedly draws at random (with
replacement) a block from the sets of blocks available and inserts it into a slot, until
a figure is completed. The resulting figure was considered to be the subject’s final
choice. We then calculated the number of mistakes associated with it. We iterated this
procedure 500,000 times for every target alternative that we used in this experiment.
The results of the simulations are shown in Table 3, reporting the estimates of dmax(·),
dmin(·), and the average number of mistakes.16
Note that choices are non-trivial for most complexity levels. The perfect fit between
target and constructed alternative can be reached only at the SF complexity level,
which is meant to be a rationality check. As complexity increases, the minimum
and maximum number of mistakes a subject can commit increases. At the highest
14 See figure 6 in the supplementary material for an example.
15 Since the build and destroy treatments are equivalent, the results of the simulations hold also for the
destroy treatment.
16 Since the values of dmax(·) and dmin(·) recovered from the simulations are only estimates of their
respective true values, then we slightly modified the payoff function defined above as follows:




3 if di (c, t) > dmax(c, t)
3 + 17 · Ii (c, t) if di (c, t) ∈ [dmin(c, t), dmax(c, t)]
20 otherwise
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Table 3 Results of the
simulations: estimates of dcmax,
dcmin, and average number of
mistakes
Compl. dmax(·) dmin(·) Average
SF 4 0 2
SC 12 4 8
MF-60s 25 11 18
MF-80s 27 9 18
MF-100s 26 10 18
MF-120s 28 8 18
MC-60s 91 53 72
MC-80s 88 56 72
MC-100s 90 54 72
MC-120s 85 59 72
DF-60s 163 93 128
DF-80s 166 84 128
DF-100s 164 92 128
DF-120s 163 87 128
DC-60s 339 236 288
DC-80s 339 236 288
DC-100s 335 241 288
DC-120s 334 243 288
complexity level, the best fit involves about 240 differences in pixels between target
and constructed alternative.17
By plotting the distribution of mistakes of subjects choosing random, we found that
it looks very similar to a normal distribution.18 That is, the distribution is symmetric
around the average number of mistakes and the mean, the median, and the mode
coincide. This observation is important, because it reveals that a subject choosing at
random would get most of the times a performance index equal to 0.5. This result
follows from the fact that the distribution of the figures constructed by using the
above method is multinomial (recall that a block is drawn at random with replacement
from a set of two or more blocks and inserted into an empty slot until a figure is
completed). Since the number of mistakes is calculated by comparing every pixel of
the constructed figures with the corresponding pixel of the target figure, then, as the
sample size increases, the distribution of the number of mistakes converges towards a
normal distribution. We will use again the results of the simulations in a section below
to compare subjects’ behaviour with random choice.
17 We reported only one entry of the maximum, minimum, and average number of mistakes for both the SC
and the SF complexity levels. This because at those complexity levels the composition of target alternative
does not change the distribution of mistakes.
18 See figures 7 and 8 in the supplementary material.
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Fig. 2 Average performance—pooled data
5 Results
In this section we measure subjects’ performance by using the performance index
Ii (c, t) that determines the performance-based payment, which we previously intro-
duced. Recall that this index is linear, lies in the interval [0, 1], and is inversely related
with the number of mistakes a subject commits.
5.1 Between-subject analysis
Pooled results are shown in Fig. 2. The treatment in which subjects performed the best
is the destroy, followed by the build and the baseline. However, while the difference
in performance between baseline and build (and destroy) is relatively substantial, the
difference between build and destroy is smaller.
We checked whether the difference in performance across treatments is statistically
significant by performing a Mann–Whitney and a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test.19 For
every subject i , we averaged the performance index across complexity levels and
across time-pressure levels and then compared the averages across treatments. The
results—summarised in Table 4—suggest that the difference in performance between
all treatments is significant at the 1% level.
By disaggregating by complexity, one can see that the difference in performance
is maximised for intermediate levels of complexity (see Fig. 3). In particular, when
the choice problem is very simple, the allocation to the treatment does not affect
subject’s performance. As complexity increases, subject’s performance progressively
deteriorates in all treatments. However, the extent to which it worsens differs across
19 The reason for which we used both the Mann–Whitney and the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test is because
the equality of variances assumption—needed for the Mann Whitney test to work—does not always hold.
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Table 4 Difference in average performance (pooled data)—baseline (n = 20) vs. build (n = 20) vs.
destroy (n = 18)
Compl. Mann–Whitney Kolmogorov–Smirnov
St.Test Stat. Exact.Sign. Test Stat. Asympt.Sig.
Baseline vs. build 4.923 0.000*** 2.688 0.000***
Baseline vs. destroy 5.262 0.000*** 3.078 0.000***
Build vs. destroy 3.245 0.001*** 1.984 0.001***
*** 1% significance
Fig. 3 Average performance by complexity
treatments. Performance in the baseline gets worse relatively soon, followed by that
of the build treatment. The performance in the destroy treatment is the last one to
deteriorate. As complexity increases to the highest levels, subject’s performance across
treatments tends to converge.
We performed aMann–Whitney and a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test to check whether
the difference in the distribution of the performance index across treatments is sta-
tistically significant (see Tables 5, 6, and 7). For every subject i and treatment t , we
averaged the performance index across time-pressure levels for each complexity level
and then compared the averages across treatments. By comparing the baseline and the
build treatment, we found that the difference is significant at 1% level for the com-
plexity levels SC, MF, and MC and insignificant at the other complexity levels. We
detected a similar patternwhenwe compared baseline and destroy. On the contrary, the
difference between build and destroy is significant (at the 1%) only for the complexity
level DF.
Figure 4 shows subjects’ performance disaggregated by time pressure. Subjects
did better in the destroy than in the build treatment for every level of time pressure.
Average performance in the build treatment is similar to that of the baseline for high
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Table 5 Difference in average performance by complexity—baseline (n = 20) vs. build (n = 20)
Compl. Mann–Whitney Kolmogorov–Smirnov
St.Test Stat. Exact.Sign. Test Stat. Asympt.Sig.
SF 2.082 0.289 0.632 0.819
SC 4.022 0.001*** 1.897 0.001***
MF 5.510 0.000*** 3.004 0.000***
MC 5.064 0.000*** 2.846 0.000***
DF 1.785 0.076* 1.107 0.172
DC 1.163 0.253 0.791 0.560
* 10% significance; *** 1% significance
Table 6 Difference in average performance by complexity—baseline (n = 20) vs. destroy (n = 18)
Compl. Mann–Whitney Kolmogorov–Smirnov
St.Test Stat. Exact.Sign. Test Stat. Asympt.Sig.
SF 1.979 0.303 0.616 0.843
SC 3.848 0.001*** 1.847 0.002***
MF 5.312 0.000*** 2.907 0.000***
MC 5.274 0.000*** 3.078 0.000***
DF 5.263 0.000*** 3.078 0.000***
DC 2.222 0.026** 1.129 0.156
** 5% significance; *** 1% significance
Table 7 Difference in average performance by complexity—build (n = 20) vs. destroy (n = 18)
Compl. Mann–Whitney Kolmogorov–Smirnov
St.Test Stat. Exact.Sign. Test Stat. Asympt.Sig.
SF 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
SC 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
MF −0.082 0.965 0.154 1.000
MC 2.153 0.030** 1.146 0.145
DF 4.444 0.000*** 2.445 0.000***
DC 0.906 0.377 0.735 0.652
** 5% significance; *** 1% significance
time-pressure levels. As time pressure is relaxed, average performance in the baseline
treatment increases and converges towards that of the destroy treatment. Interestingly,
performance in the baseline treatment decreases by relaxing time pressure from 100
to 120 s. There are two possible explanations. First, subjects got bored and started
to play randomly. We will explicitly analyse random choice in the next subsection.
Second, whenever subjects have relatively little time (or, equivalently, the search cost
is high), then they look for a local optimum and, as soon as they discover one, they
123
Does inducing choice procedures make individuals better off…
Fig. 4 Average performance by time pressure
Table 8 Difference in average performance by time pressure—baseline (n = 20) vs. build (n = 20)
Time Pr. (s) Mann–Whitney Kolmogorov–Smirnov
St.Test Stat. Exact.Sign. Test Stat. Asympt.Sig.
60 0.893 0.383 0.791 0.560
80 3.435 0.000*** 1.423 0.035**
100 4.355 0.000*** 2.530 0.000***
120 5.302 0.000*** 2.846 0.000***
** 5% significance; *** 1% significance
stop searching. On the other hand, when subjects realize that they have relatively more
time, they keep searching, despite having possibly identified a local optimum, because
their goal is to identify the global optimum.However, by doing so they end up selecting
a worse alternative.
In order to perform Mann–Whitney and Kolmogorov–Smirnov, we averaged—for
every subject and treatment—the performance index across complexity levels for each
time-pressure level and then compared the averages across treatments. The tests sug-
gest that the difference in the distribution of the performance index between baseline
and build is statistically significant at 1% level for 80, 100, and 120 s time-pressure
levels. On the other hand, the divergence in performance between baseline and destroy
is significant for all time-pressure levels. By comparing the build and the destroy treat-
ments, the difference is statistically significant only for a time pressure of 60 s. At the
other time-pressure levels, the difference is either insignificant or significant at higher
levels. See Tables 8, 9, and 10 for the details.20
20 In the destroy treatment we implicitly set a lower bound on the performance index, because by changing
the colour of one block only, subjects can complete a figure. By doing so, subjects would get a performance
index equal to approximately 0.5, because, as explained above, we constructed the target alternatives by
randomly colouring half of the pixels red and the remaining half beige. A subject playing in this way would
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Table 9 Difference in average performance by time pressure—baseline (n = 20) vs. destroy (n = 18)
Time Pr. (s) Mann–Whitney Kolmogorov–Smirnov
St.Test Stat. Exact.Sign. Test Stat. Asympt.Sig.
60 4.970 0.000*** 2.616 0.000***
80 4.736 0.000*** 2.411 0.000***
100 4.941 0.000*** 2.599 0.000***
120 5.264 0.000*** 3.078 0.000***
*** 1% significance
Table 10 Difference in average performance by time pressure—build (n = 20) vs. destroy (n = 18)
Time Pr. (s) Mann–Whitney Kolmogorov–Smirnov
St.Test Stat. Exact.Sign. Test Stat. Asympt.Sig.
60 3.128 0.001*** 2.001 0.001***
80 2.310 0.020** 1.300 0.068*
100 1.257 0.217 1.146 0.145*
120 1.785 0.077* 1.060 0.211
* 10% significance; ** 5% significance; *** 1% significance
We also looked at whether demographics have an effect on subjects’ performance.
We could not find any systematic difference in behaviour across demographic groups
both within and across treatments.
5.2 Random choice
In order to investigate whether subjects’ choice is different from random choice, we
first generated random choice data. In the baseline treatment this task was straight-
forward, as subjects chose among 16 alternatives only. Hence, we assigned a 116
probability to every option at each choice problem. In the build and destroy treat-
ments, we used the results of the simulations that we discussed in Sect. 4.
Once that random choice was generated, we identified the maximum and minimum
number of mistakes a subject could commit and the median number of mistakes for
Footnote 20 contiuned
behave in a way that is analogous to a subject choosing randomly (see Sect. 4). However, the data clearly
reveal that such lower bound is not binding for at least two reasons. First, the average number of moves
(defined as the number of times a subject changed the colour of a block) in the destroy treatment is greater
than one. Specifically, the average number of moves (with standard deviation in brackets) is 2.15 (0.32)
at the SF, 2.13 (0.19) at the SC, 6.71 (2.70) at the MF, 7.71 (1.96) at the MC, 19.96 (6.85) at the DF, and
24.26 (9.99) at the DC complexity levels. In terms of time pressure, the average number of moves (with
standard deviation in brackets) is 9.62 (3.01) at 60 s, 10.65 (3.10) at 80s, 10.16 (3.44) at 100 s, and 11.52
(3.75) at 120 s. Second, as it will become clearer in the next subsection, subjects clearly chose differently
from random in the destroy treatment.
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Table 11 Subject vs. random choice: baseline treatment (n = 20)
Target Binomial Wilcoxon Signed Rank
Compl. Time Pr. (s) St.Test Stat. p value Sig. St.Test Stat. p value Sig.
SF 60 −4.249 0.000 *** 4.472 0.000 ***
SF 80 −4.249 0.000 *** 4.472 0.000 ***
SF 100 −4.249 0.000 *** 4.300 0.000 ***
SF 120 −4.249 0.000 *** 4.300 0.000 ***
SC 60 −4.249 0.000 *** 4.379 0.000 ***
SC 80 −3.801 0.000 *** 3.962 0.006 ***
SC 100 −4.249 0.000 *** 4.179 0.000 ***
SC 120 −4.249 0.000 ** 4.053 0.000 ***
MF 60 −2.460 0.012 ** 2.298 0.022 **
MF 80 −3.801 0.000 *** 3.948 0.000 ***
MF 100 −3.354 0.000 *** 4.009 0.000 ***
MF 120 0.000 1.000 – 2.712 0.007 ***
MC 60 −1.565 0.115 – 1.990 0.047 **
MC 80 −2.460 0.012 ** 3.302 0.001 ***
MC 100 −2.012 0.041 ** 2.419 0.016 **
MC 120 −1.118 0.263 – 0.678 0.498 –
DF 60 −0.671 0.503 – 2.103 0.035 **
DF 80 0.671 0.503 – 0.113 0.910 –
DF 100 −2.460 0.012 ** 2.908 0.004 **
DF 120 −0.671 0.503 – 0.300 0.764 –
DC 60 0.000 1.000 – −0.975 0.329 –
DC 80 −0.224 0.824 – 1.653 0.098 *
DC 100 −0.224 0.824 – 0.824 0.410 –
DC 120 −2.182 0.027 ** 2.938 0.003 ***
* 10% significance; ** 5% significance; *** 1% significance
each choice problem. We then calculated the performance index associated with the
median choice. Finally, we tested whether the difference in the performance index
associated with the median random choice is statistically different from the perfor-
mance index associated with the subjects’ median choice by using the binomial and
the Wilcoxon signed rank tests. Detailed results are reported in Tables 11, 12, and 13.
In the baseline treatment subjects distinctly chose different from random at rel-
atively simple problems. We indeed find that the difference between subjects’ and
randommedian choice is statistically significant at 5% (or below). At relatively harder
problems, we do not detect any statistically significant difference. On the contrary, in
the build and destroy treatments the difference between subjects’ and random median
choice is statistically significant at almost all choice problems regardless of complexity.
Interestingly,we record that in the build treatment subjects’ choice is not statistically
different from random at difficult problems (DF and DC) with very high time pressure
(60 s). Recall that at the DF and DC complexity levels subjects have to fill in 16 slots to
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Table 12 Subject vs. random choice: build treatment (n = 20)
Target Binomial Wilcoxon Signed Rank
Compl. Time Pr. (s) St.Test Stat. p value Sig. St.Test Stat. p value Sig.
SF 60 −3.928 0.000 *** 4.472 0.000 ***
SF 80 −3.928 0.000 *** 4.472 0.000 ***
SF 100 −3.928 0.000 *** 4.472 0.000 ***
SF 120 −3.928 0.000 *** 4.472 0.000 ***
SC 60 −3.928 0.000 *** 4.472 0.000 ***
SC 80 −3.928 0.000 *** 4.472 0.000 ***
SC 100 −3.928 0.000 *** 4.472 0.000 ***
SC 120 −3.928 0.000 *** 4.472 0.000 ***
MF 60 −3.928 0.000 *** 4.308 0.000 ***
MF 80 −4.364 0.000 *** 4.412 0.000 ***
MF 100 −3.928 0.000 *** 4.379 0.000 ***
MF 120 −3.928 0.000 *** 4.379 0.000 ***
MC 60 −3.055 0.001 *** 2.561 0.010 ***
MC 80 −3.928 0.000 *** 3.302 0.001 ***
MC 100 −3.928 0.000 *** 2.419 0.016 **
MC 120 −4.364 0.000 *** 4.040 0.000 ***
DF 60 0.436 0.664 – −1.596 0.110 –
DF 80 −2.619 0.007 *** 2.557 0.011 **
DF 100 −3.055 0.001 *** 3.189 0.001 ***
DF 120 −3.491 0.000 *** 3.272 0.001 ***
DC 60 −0.873 0.383 – −0.122 0.903 –
DC 80 −2.182 0.027 ** 1.791 0.073 *
DC 100 −3.055 0.001 *** 3.684 0.000 ***
DC 120 −2.294 0.019 ** 3.141 0.002 ***
* 10% significance; ** 5% significance; *** 1% significance
make a figure, which is a time-consuming task. By looking at the data, we found that at
very hard problems under high time pressure many subjects did not complete a figure
within the time limit. Hence, the reason for which we observe such pattern is that, as
specified in the instructions, a performance-based payoff equal to zero is assigned if
subjects fail to select (or construct) a figure within the time limit. As expected, we do
not detect such pattern in the build treatment.
6 Related literature and conclusion
Our paper is interdisciplinary and related with the multi-attribute individual decision-
making literature in both psychology and economics. Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky pioneerd a fruitful tradition in psychology on multi-attribute individual
decision-making by establishing the so-called ‘heuristic-and-biases’ research agenda
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Table 13 Subject vs. random choice: destroy treatment (n = 18)
Target Binomial Wilcoxon Signed Rank
Compl. Time Pr. (s) St.Test Stat. p value Sig. St.Test Stat. p value Sig.
SF 60 −3.671 0.000 *** 4.243 0.000 ***
SF 80 −3.671 0.000 *** 4.243 0.000 ***
SF 100 −3.671 0.000 *** 4.243 0.000 ***
SF 120 −3.671 0.000 *** 4.243 0.000 ***
SC 60 −3.671 0.000 *** 4.243 0.000 ***
SC 80 −3.671 0.000 *** 4.243 0.000 ***
SC 100 −3.671 0.000 *** 4.243 0.000 ***
SC 120 −3.671 0.000 ** 4.243 0.000 ***
MF 60 −3.671 0.000 *** 4.140 0.000 ***
MF 80 −4.129 0.000 *** 4.062 0.000 ***
MF 100 −3.671 0.000 *** 4.243 0.000 ***
MF 120 −3.671 0.000 *** 4.146 0.000 ***
MC 60 −3.671 0.000 *** 3.838 0.000 ***
MC 80 −3.671 0.000 *** 3.789 0.000 ***
MC 100 −3.671 0.000 *** 3.859 0.000 ***
MC 120 −4.129 0.000 *** 3.894 0.000 ***
DF 60 −3.671 0.000 *** 3.389 0.000 ***
DF 80 −3.671 0.000 *** 3.790 0.000 ***
DF 100 −3.671 0.000 *** 3.780 0.000 ***
DF 120 −3.671 0.000 *** 3.870 0.000 ***
DC 60 −2.294 0.019 ** 2.657 0.008 ***
DC 80 −2.753 0.004 ** 3.340 0.001 ***
DC 100 −1.835 0.064 * 2.680 0.007 ***
DC 120 −2.012 0.041 ** 0.937 0.349 –
* 10% significance; ** 5% significance; *** 1% significance
(Gilovich et al. 2002). Given that humans are irrational, its goal is to investigate
the heuristics that individuals use to make decisions and discover potential biases in
their behaviour. As an example, a framing effect refers to the phenomenon whereby
individuals change their decision whenever the same choice problem is presented in
different ways (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Unlike the heuristic-and-biases tradi-
tion that mainly focuses on decisions under uncertainty, Payne et al. (1993) uses verbal
protocols andmouselab to test adaptivity inmulti-attribute decision-making under cer-
tainty. They find that people adapt the choice procedure to the choice environment and
are willing to save cognitive effort. In particular, subjects tend to use holistic pro-
cedures when more weight is put on the goal of maximizing accuracy with respect
to the goal of minimizing cognitive effort. On the other hand, under time pressure
decision-makers seem to use CBS heuristics. The ‘fast-and-frugal’ research tradition
further develops the work of Payne et al. (1993) by—unlike the heuristic-and-biases
approach -investigating the conditions under which a certain class of heuristics better
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describes subjects’ behaviour (Gigerenzer et al. 1999; Gigerenzer and Selten 2001).21
For example, Rieskamp andHoffrage (2008) use themouselab technique to investigate
how inference strategies are affected by the amount of time pressure. They find that
under relatively high (resp., low) time pressure, subjects tend to use CBS (resp., holis-
tic) heuristics, such as the lexicographic procedure. More recently, the fast-and-frugal
approach has increased its attention to real-world applications (Gigerenzer et al. 2011;
Gigerenzer 2015).
The appearance of CBS procedures in economics goes back at least to Rubin-
stein (1988) that implicitly proposes a CBS model to explain the Allais paradox by
assuming that the decision-maker assesses prizes and probabilities separately when
choosing among lotteries. A first important experimental-economics contribution to
this literature is Gabaix et al. (2006) that uses mouselab test individual’s information
acquisition patterns in an N -good game. That is, subjects are presented with an N · M
matrix of numbers. Each row is interpreted as an alternative and each column as an
attribute. Subjects have to choose the row that maximises the algebraic sum of the
numbers arranged on the row. Gabaix et al. (2006) find that the directed cognition
model—according to which subjects perform the next search operation as if it was
the last one—predicts the aggregate information acquisition patterns that subjects fol-
low.22 Unlike Gabaix et al. (2006), Reutskaja et al. (2011) use the more sophisticated
eye-tracking technique to investigate consumers’ search and choice attitudes on snack
items under very high time pressure. They find that subjects’ behaviour is consistent
with a hybrid of the standard and the satisficingmodel of search.23 The closest study to
our work is Arieli et al. (2011) that also uses eye-tracking to test whether subjects use
holistic or CBS procedures while choosing binary lotteries. Arieli et al. (2011) find that
whenever the computation of the expected value is difficult, subject’s eye movements
are consistent with the use of CBS heuristics. On the contrary, when computations are
easier, subjects’ behaviour is consistent with a hybrid of a CBS and holistic procedure.
Unlike our work, the above branches of literature investigate whether a certain
heuristic (or class of heuristics) describes subjects’ behaviour. On the contrary, moti-
vated by the proliferation of online choice platforms, we examine whether inducing
subjects to use certain heuristics has an effect on their choice behaviour by proposing
an innovative experiment.We are the first to show that CBS proceduresmay bewelfare
increasing. In particular, our results suggest that at intermediate levels of complexity
inducing subjects to use CBS procedures (as opposed to holistic ones) makes them
better off. On the contrary, at very simple and very complex problems the induced
21 The main difference between Payne et al. (1993) and the fast-and-frugal approach is the definition of
accuracy of an heuristic. While Payne et al. (1993) define it in terms of how different is the heuristic
employed by a decision-maker from the optimal one, the fast-and frugal approach interprets it as how well
the heuristic used by a decision-maker describes subjects’ behaviour.
22 More recently, Sanjurjo (2015) uses Gabaix et al. (2006)’s data to test his multi-attribute optimal search
model. He finds that subjects investigate too much within alternatives and fail to optimally select the next
alternatives to be explored.
23 See also Caplin et al. (2011) for an experiment testing the satisficing model of search. Another study that
uses eye-tracking is Shi et al. (2013), according towhich information acquisition patterns in amulti-attribute
online choice environment are analysed. The authors find that subjects frequently change search strategies
and look up a few attributes or alternatives before switching strategy.
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heuristic does not affect the subjects’ performance. Finally, we show that when sub-
jects are encouraged to use a holistic procedure, we cannot rule out the hypothesis that
their choice behaviour is equivalent to that generated by random choice at relatively
complex problems.
Our results provide support the growing theoretical economic literature that assumes
individuals to use CBS choice procedures, such as shortlisting (Manzini and Mariotti
2007; Apesteguia and Ballester 2013).24 More broadly, our results support Herbert
Simon (Simon 1955, 1956)’s intuition that the choice environment plays a crucial role
in determining which heuristic decision-makers use to make decisions. We hypothe-
sise that the reason for which CBS heuristics are more efficient than holistic ones is
two-fold. On the one hand, CBS procedures encompass a more natural cognitive pro-
cess than holistic ones. On the other hand, unlike holistic procedures, CBS procedures
decompose difficult problems into simpler ones and, as a result, allow decision-makers
to achieve better results at relatively harder problems. In order to test this conjecture
we intend to run a follow-up experiment in which—after experimenting—subjects are
asked to choose both the choice platform (either holistic or CBS) and the complexity
level, where incentives are such that to harder problems correspond a higher mone-
tary reward, ceteris paribus. We expect subjects preferring ‘CBS choice platforms’ to
choose relatively high complexity levels.25
We view this paper as a first step to investigate the broad research question that we
propose. Our experimental design is flexible and can naturally be extended in multi-
ple intriguing directions. First, we provide evidence that as time pressure is relaxed,
performance improves. Moreover, we show that at very complex problems whether
subjects are induced to use holistic or CBS procedures does not have a significant
effect on their performance. A first robustness check would be to verify what happens
if (i) there is no time limit and (ii) incentives are increased at complex problems.
Second, we measured complexity of a figure with the number of pixels it is made
of, which is consistent with the psychology literature (Oliva et al. 2004). We are
aware that there are alternative measures of complexity that we could have used.
For example, we have looked at the computer science literature and found a metric
for complexity—called Kolmogorov complexity—based on algorithmic information
theory. It turns out that a visual form can be represented by a string of symbols (Donderi
2006). In our experiment figures can be seen as matrices of zeros and ones and can,
therefore, be described as strings. Informally, the Kolmogorov complexity of a string
is defined as the length of the shortest program needed to reproduce the string itself
24 See alsoBernheimandRangel (2007),Rubinstein andSalant (2012), andApesteguia andBallester (2015)
as decision theoretic papers that propose welfare measure under the assumption that decision-makers are
not necessarily fully rational.
25 Our results also provide support to the recognition-by-components (RBC) theory (Biederman 1987).
The RBC theory is a bottom-up theory of visual perception according to which humans recognise an
object by recognising its ‘geons’—i.e., primitive geometric figures of which the object is made, such
as blocks, cylinders, edges, etc. (Sternberg and Sternberg 2012). While the build and destroy treatment
explicitly partition a figure into primitive components, the baseline treatment does not do so and, as a result,
complicates the recognition by components. The fact that inducing subjects to use CBS as opposed to
holistic procedures makes them better off indicates that a process of recognition by components facilitates
the subjects’ task in this experiment.
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(Li and Vitányi 1997). For example, the 20-digit string 10101010101010101010 is
Kolmogorov-simpler than the 20-digit string 11010000111010111111, as while the
shortest way of describing the former is to write it as a 10-time repetition of the binary
string 10, the shortest way of describing the latter is to fully rewrite it, as there are no
patterns in it. An interesting extension to the current experimental design would be
to generate target figures of different Kolmogorov complexity and verify whether our
results are robust to the modification.
Third, in this experiment we used abstract figures as objects of choice because we
wanted a frame that was as neutral as possible in order to collect generalizable results.
In a follow-up experiment, instead of abstract figures, we could use lotteries (Arieli
et al. 2011), algebraic sums (Payne et al. 1993; Gabaix et al. 2006; Caplin et al. 2011)
or real goods (Reutskaja et al. 2011) as objects of choice and compare the results with
other studies.
Fourth, a feature of the current experiment is that no tradeoffs between attributes
are generated in the build (and destroy) treatment. That is, it is not the case that
by constructing a figure with certain characteristics (i.e., allocating a certain bloc in a
certain slot) subjects are restricted in shaping the other characteristics. Instead, subjects
have to identify ‘their most preferred attribute value’ for each attribute independently
of any other attribute. In the real world, on the contrary, there are examples of both
conflicting and non-conflicting attributes. An example of the former is given by the
fact that if an individual—searching for a flat through a web-search engine—increases
(resp., decreases) the number of desired bedrooms, then the rent of the shortlisted flats
necessarily increases (resp., decreases), other things being equal. As an example of the
latter, the fact that one chooses a red colour for the Ferrari through the car configurator
does not restrict at all the choice of the wheel cap. One way of investigating whether
our results are robust to the heterogeneity in the presence/absence of tradeoffs between
attributes is to use real goods as alternatives.
Fifth, in this experiment we examined the effects of encouraging subjects to use
certain classes of heuristics by inducing preferences, because we wanted to start from
a scenario over which we have full control. This has given us a first insight into how
choices are affected by inducing individuals to use certain choice procedures, given
preferences. The natural following step is to investigate whether inducing subjects to
use certain heuristics has an effect on preferences as well. We plan to investigate these
issues in a series of follow-up experiments.
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